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3 Terrorist \Vatchlists 
Jeffrey Kahn 1 
This chapter assesses the legal history and policy development of the U.S. government's 
system of terrorist watchlists and the institutions established to create and use them. 
vVatchlisting is in fact an old practice given new meaning by technological change and 
the societal impact of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Statutes and judicial 
precedents from an earlier era on which the first post-9/11 watchlists \Vere built were 
not made to regulate the expanded uses of the new \Vatchlists and presented few if any 
constraints on their development. Civil litigation has both revealed the inner workings 
of terrorist watchlists and spurred some reforms to them. \\Thile these reforms have suc-
ceeded in adding some due process protections to watchlisting remedies, the underlying 
premise of the new watchlists, and the hierarchies of citizenship that they produce, have 
not been subject to much challenge in either the courts or the Congress. 
Introduction 
"Major Strasser's been shot," police captain Renault tells his men as they rush into the 
final scene of the film Casablanca. "Round up the usual suspects." 1 Renault witnessed 
the shooting himself, so his order is ironic and subversive. But it also sounds oddly rou-
tine; the arriving kepis take it in stride. Of course they have a go-to list of suspects. Good 
police work means keeping track of people, especially those whose objectively verifiable 
criminal record or subjectively assessed character elicits suspicion about their future 
conduct. 
\\le might call these the first watchlists: quite literally, lists of people worth watching. 
How else does the cop walking his usual beat "know" his assigned neighborhood save 
for the list of bad apples he has drawn up in his mind? Thus, "watchlisting" is an idea 
that has long influenced police practices in the United States and elsewhere, though 
some now balk as technology grows their size and searchability. 2 In the United States, 
however, law and tradition have always established a limit, a divide that watchlists could 
2 
Professor of Law and Gerald J. Ford Research Fellow, SMU Dedman School of Law. 
CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942). 
See, e.g., Chicago Police Department Special Order S 10-06, July 20, 2015, Targeted Repeat-Offender 
Apprehension and Prosecution (TR.AP.) Program (ordering District Commanders to select up to five 
individuals each for inclusion on this watchlist, "identified because of their criminal history, propensity 
for violence, and the [sic] involvement in narcotics distribution. The primary goal ofT.R.A.P. is focused 
on enhanced prosecution to detain, convict, and incarcerate these offenders before they commit further 
crimes of violence"). 
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not cross. The propensity evidence used to watchlist a suspect is generally inadmissible 
to try the accused in a court of law.' Police may wish to "round up the usual suspects," 
but their conviction depends on admissible evidence of guilt for a particular past act that 
is publicly presented to a neutral judge and, perhaps, a jury.4 
Historically, three features marked this boundary - the who, what, and where of this 
dividing line. Each element established an important check on the state's police power. 
Who decides the individual's fate changes at this divide: executive decision making is 
now subjected to judicial oversight. The evidence justifying state action - the what of 
watchlists - must satisfy substantial rules of evidence that extend beyond claims of pro-
pensity or reasonable suspicion. 5 And where that evaluative process occurs is moved from 
behind closed doors in police stations to courtrooms open to all. 
These three features combine both substantive and structural protections for indi-
vidual liberty. As Justice Frankfurter described the line in rejecting a government list 
of Communist organizations fashioned by the Attorney General for the Loyalty Review 
Board of the United States Civil Service Commission: 
Man being what he is cannot safely be trusted with complete immunity from outward 
responsibility in depriving others of their rights .... The validity and moral authority of a 
conclusion largely depend on the mode by which it was reached. Secrecy is not congen-
ial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness.6 
The list that resulted from the Attorney General's secret assessment process crossed that 
line with ruinous consequences for those he listed. "No better instrument has been 
devised for arriving at truth," Frankfurter argued, "than to give a person in jeopardy of 
serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better 
way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that 
justice has been done."7 
All in all, this dividing line sought to prevent ordinary watchlists from becoming 
blacklists, which single out individuals "for adverse legal consequences that go beyond 
the discomfort associated with being the target of a lawfully conducted investigation."8 
3 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evie!. 404 (2016). It must be acknowledged that "in today's criminal justice system, ... 
the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for 
a defendant." 1\!Iissouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 144 (2012). Nevertheless, the dividing line remains for those 
who demand their right to cross it. 
4 Michelso11 v. U11ited States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) ("The State may not show defendant's prior 
trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might 
logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not 
rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so 
overpersuacle them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend 
against a particular charge") (internal citations omitted). 
This would surprise Captain Renault. In the French legal system, the dossier informing the juge d'i11struc-
tio11 includes propensity and character evidence concerning the accused, based on the theory "On juge 
l'homme, /xis les faits" ("One judges the man, not the acts"). Unlike the Anglo-American adversarial tradi-
tion, the judiciary are involved in the compilation of the dossier and bear responsibility at various stages for 
confirming its adherence to procedural rules about its composition. 6 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (footnote omitted). 
7 Id. 
8 This distinction, using this nomenclature, was first used in the context of terrorist watchlists by Aarof1 H. 
Caplan, No11attai11der as a Liberty Interest, 2010 Wisc. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2010). 
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Filtering the executive's lists through the screen of a neutral magistrate reduces the speed 
and effectiveness of executive action, but this has generally been the preferred check lo 
protect individual liberty. When blacklists have emerged, often in response to national 
crises, they eventually have been subject to judicial review.9 
There is something artificial about this divide. By what measure is legal consequence 
or loss "adverse" or "serious" enough to cross the line? \i\lhen does an investigation shade 
into a violation of rights? 10 The state's officers, if they so desire, can make investigation 
a public spectacle or a secret affair; regardless, the suspect is left to the tender mercies 
of police and prosecutor, without any judicial intervention. The divide is also based 
on certain assumptions. Why assume, first of all, that the encl goal - the safely of the 
community- is to be achieved within the rigid confines of the criminal justice system? 
\Vhy presume the police - local, public, accessible- to be the proper government agents 
tasked with this goal? 
The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, severely challenged 
these assumptions and this divide. The new watchlists it produced do not pursue the 
goal of public safely through the criminal justice system. The national security concerns 
that catalyzed watchlisting tended to complicate public access to the watchlisters them-
selves. Those complaining that watchlists caused them adverse legal consequences or 
serious losses - the very nature of any injuries is often disputed - found ordinary avenues 
to judicial review blocked. At the same time, a technological revolution in commu-
nications and data mining fueled the proliferation of these ne\v watchlists as oxygen 
fuels fire. 
It is too early to tell how the changes worked on society by technological revolutions 
in transportation, communications, and computing have affected this historic divide. 
Some courts are slowly conforming watchlists to the limits set by our law and past tradi-
tions. But other courts have turned away legal challenges and watchlists have generally 
been upheld in the court of public opinion. The No-Fly List, for example, prevents 
listed individuals from boarding commercial aircraft. Such watchlists are now an estab-
lished feature in the country's national security architecture, as natural to a generation of 
Americans born after 9/11 as submitting to a search at an airport (required by statute only 
since 1974). 11 Indeed, the very idea of a dividing line has been challenged by national 
security policy makers and officials on the front line of operations who question whether 
the world has become too fast, too connected, and too dangerous for checks and bal-
ances designed in and for an earlier era. 
This chapter evaluates the emergence of these new watchlists, no longer limited to 
watching. The No-Fly List was the prototype and progenitor for this new model. Its 
development led to the creation of the much broader based Terrorist Screening Database 
9 McGrath determined the fate of the Attorney General's list of Communist organizations, sufJra note 6. 
The rise and fall of passport controls in the 1940s and 1950s, foreshadowing today's No-Fly List, are 
examined in detail as part of the analysis of today's watchlisting system in Jeffrey Kahn, MRS. SHIPLEY's 
GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND TERRORIST WATCI-ILISTS (2013). 
lO Surveillance can also take forms that implicate the Fourth Amendment, in which case the divide behveen 
watchlists and arrests becomes harder to define. A neutral magistrate may be involved, but in nonpublic, 
ex parte ways. Evidentiary requirements may be lower. The complexities of this environment are the 
reason for this book. But even in this hazier borderland, the same divide must eventually be crossed if the 
suspect is to become an accused. Whether it is crossed is now a more salient question than ever before, and 
the reason for this chapter. 
11 Air Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-366, SS 3 l 5(a) & 1111, 88 Stat. 415 (1974). 
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(TSDB) - the central watchlist from which specialized watchlists are created. It also led 
to the creation of new offices and agencies to build, stock, and curate the TSDB and 
other watchlists, most notably the Terrorist Screening Center. The history of this process 
shows how expectations built by the traditional use of watchlists presented obstacles and 
opportunities for the parties, lawyers, and policy makers whose first experiences with 
terrorist watchlists led to the system in place today. 
I History 
Long before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there were plenty of watchlists 
in the United States. For the most part, these were in the possession of local or perhaps 
regional law enforcement offices, and they were neither computerized nor connected 
to other departments of government. Few national "databases" (to use an anachronism) 
existed in this analog era of file cabinets and note cards. The "Official and Confidential" 
files that FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover kept for more than five decades might come to 
mind, though at a conservatively estimated seventeen thousand pages in 165 files, it was 
hardly the largest or most useful collection of its day. 12 At their peak in 1953, the files of 
Ruth Shipley's passport office in the State Department kept watch on 12 million passport 
applicants and were housed in 1,250 filing cabinets.13 
National watchlists came into their own in a computer era that enabled (relatively) 
speedy processing and distributing of large volumes of information. Post-Watergate, 
Senator Church's select committee, Vice President Rockefeller's presidential commis-
sion, and others uncovered a raft of secret surveillance and intelligence programs that 
went beyond collecting information. For example, the "Special Services Staff," which 
operated within the IRS from 1969 to 1973, 
believed its mission included saving the country from subversives, extremists, and anti-
establishment organizations and individuals [and] reviewed for audit or collection 
potential organizations and individuals selected by other agencies, such as the Internal 
Security Division of the Justice Department and the FBI, on bases having no relation to 
the likelihood that such organizations or individuals had violated the tax laws. 14 
Using classified documents and top secret clearances, the group reviewed biweekly com-
puter printouts ranging between ten thousand and sixteen thousand names of "officers, 
members and affiliates of activist, extremist and revolutionary organizations" so desig-
nated by the FBI or Justice Department. 15 
More open, and certainly less controversial, were watchlists of a more routine 
variety. Since 1995, for example, the FBI had maintained a "Violent Gangfferrorist 
Organization File" (VGTOF). Federal, state, and local law enforcement could access it 
in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, which in 2004 contained 
12 A Byte out of History: J. Edgar Hoover's "Official 6 Conftdentia/" Files, July 11, 2005, https://www.fbi.gov/ 
news/sto ries/2 00 5 /ju ly /j. -edga r-hoovers-o ffi cial-con fiden tia 1-fil es. 
13 Kahn, sufm1 note 9, at 154. 
14 Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Book III, 
Final Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to 
Intelligence Activities 881 (Apr. 23, 1976). 
15 Id. at 880 and 884. 
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more than 43 million records. 16 (In August 2009, the VGTOF separated into a Gang 
File and a Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST) File.) The State Department also 
created a list in 1995 - the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) - that 
helped vet visa and passport applications. On September 11, 2001, CLASS contained 
roughly 10 million records on individuals with criminal backgrounds, past visa deni-
als, or other grounds for heightened suspicion. 17 Other agencies tasked with immigra-
tion, customs inspection, and intelligence gathering possessed their own lists designed 
for their specialized purposes. As late as April 2003, the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) reported that "nine federal agencies, which prior to the establishment of DHS 
spanned five different cabinet-level departments, currently maintain twelve terrorist 
and criminal watch lists." 18 
Common features emerge from this history. First, most watehlists had a foreign orien-
tation - consular officers, customs agents, and other officials created lists that reflected 
their agency mission, which tended to be oriented to foreign threats and concerns at the 
border. Thus, few paid attention to the effect on the watchlisted themselves, who on the 
whole lacked legally cognizable interests or political representation. In any event, these 
were old-fashioned watchlists. Follow-up action - whether an arrest, deportation, visa 
denial, or asset seizure - was invariably public, trnceable to the agency, and subject to 
judicial review. 
Second, information sharing was the exception, not the rule. Interagency rivalries and 
the desire to protect sources and methods of intelligence created "silos" of information 
rather than networks for distributing it. The 9/11 Commission called this a Cold War era 
preoccupation with counterintelligence that was "no longer appropriate." It therefore 
advised that the "culture of agencies feeling they own the information they gathered at 
taxpayer expense must be replaced by a culture in which the agencies instead feel they 
have a duty to the information - to repay the taxpayers' investment by making that infor-
mation available." 19 
Third, the emergence of computer databases notwithstanding, watchlists tended to 
produce unwieldy paper documents. One State Department list of particular signifi-
cance for future watchlists, called "TIPOFF," began its life in 1987 as a shoebox full 
of index cards.20 This paper world exacerbated the information-sharing problems agen-
cies experienced with each other. It slowed data transfer to the speed of a fax machine 
or modem. 
The No-Fly List, the first modern terrorist watehlist, followed these patterns. Violent 
aircraft hijackings and bombings in the 1970s and 1980s led to the creation of a ne\v 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) authority to issue "security directives." The 
16 William J. Krouse, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under Homeland Security Presidential 
_ Directive 6, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (RL32366) 31 (2004). 
11 Thomas R. Eldridge, et al. 9/n AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: STAFF REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 78 (2004). 
lS U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: TERRORIST WATCH LISTS 
SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO PROMOTE BETTER INTEGRATION AND SHARING (GA0-03-322) 12 
(April 2003). 
19 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 417 (2004). 
20 Krouse, supra note 16, at 26. 
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"do-not-carry" variety were obligatory orders directing commercial airlines not to carry 
a particular passenger whom the FM determined to present a "specific and credible 
threat" to civil aviation (other security directives focused on security infrastructure and 
other security requirements not targeting specific individuals). Security directives took 
the form of thermal faxes to airline security officers. 
Above the technology that slowed distribution stood a bureaucracy that often slowed it 
further. Every agency whose intelligence contributed to a security directive had to sign 
off on its release, prompting natural conflicts over balancing the risk of air piracy with the 
exposure of sources and methods of intelligence gathering. These impediments reduced 
the volume and frequency of security directives. On September 11, 2001, a total of three 
directives prohibited sixteen people from boarding commercial aircraft. None of them 
was among the attackers. 21 
The 9111 commissioners were enraged by these statistics. By 2001, the State 
Department's TIPOFF database (now a part of CLASS) had grown to list more than 
sixty thousand suspected terrorists who that agency thought should be denied visas. True 
to their "stovepiped" practices, members of the intelligence community contributed to 
this database at a miserly rate. 22 And although sharing occurred between some agen-
cies, the FM was not among them; indeed, one senior FM official admitted to the 9/ 
11 Commission that he learned of the very existence of TIPOFF the day before his 
testimony in 2004. 23 The FM's intelligence office relied on the willingness of other 
members of the intelligence community to supply it with information and to allow that 
information to be shared with the airlines. This was classic "stovepiping," or "silo," man-
agement of intelligei1ce and the 9/11 commissioners took turns berating the officials who 
appeared before them for institutionalized hoarding of information. 
Notwithstanding their infrequent use, security directives were an important milestone 
in the history of the new watchlists. Security directives departed from the conventions of 
the old watchlists in important ways. This system was not linked to the criminal justice 
system or border protection. Its purposes were not investigatory but were not intended 
to be punitive either; the purpose was, singularly, aviation security. For the first time, 
watchlisting results were sent to private actors (airlines) directing them to take concrete 
action against an individual. They were not only the model but also the legal instrument 
through which the No-Fly List was created. Michael Jackson, second in command at 
the Department of Transportation on 9111 and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security 
from 2005 to 2007, recalled: 
It's hard to underestimate the personal sense of responsibility that the senior government 
leaders felt in trying to do everything that was reasonable and yet doable to prevent 
another attack. And the watchlist was a core tool in that effort. So it would have been 
21 Memorandum from Claudio Manno, Acting Associate Under Secretary for Transportation Security 
Intelligence, to Associate Under Secretary for Security Regulation and Policy (Oct. 16, 2002). 
22 ELDRIDGE, sufm1 note 17, at 80 ("In 2001, the CIA provided 1,527 source documents to TIPOFF; the 
State Department, 2, 013; the INS, 173. The FBI, during this same year, provided 63 documents to 
TIPOFF - fewer than were obtained from the public media, and about the same number as were provided 
by the Australian Intelligence Agency (52)"). 
23 Testimony of Rear Admiral Catha! "Irish" Flynn USN (ret), Associate FAA Administrator for Civil Aviation 
Security, Seventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, Jan. 27, 2004, at 29. 
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irresponsible not to develop and actively manage a watch list of the sort that we ended up 
with. And there was no disagreement about that, really, amongst the team. 24 
II Creation: Building Institutions 
77 
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act, signed by President George W. Bush in 
November 2001, transferred the FM's responsibility for aviation security to the new 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). That statute instructed the new agency, 
"in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and air carriers," to require 
airlines 
to use information from government agencies to identify individuals on passenger lists 
who may be a threat to civil aviation or national security and, if such an individual is 
identified, noti~1 appropriate law enforcement agencies, prevent the individual from 
boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to that individual.25 
This new statute did not grant the TSA the power to create a watchlist. The legal 
authority for the No-Fly List already existed in the old FM "do-not-carry" security direc-
tives, which were transferred to the new TSA. 26 The new language, read carefully, did 
not grant any authority to compose watchlists at all, merely to "use information from 
government agencies" - and no particular agency is named. Richard Falkenrath, a spe-
cial assistant to President Bush who was instrumental in designing this first watchlisting 
system, recalled: 
It was just accidental that the authority originated in \the TSA's) authorizing statute, 
I assume, and then some pre-9/11 security directive. It was really grabbed a hold of 
by the White House, which was driving everything back then - FBI, CIA to a certain 
extent. And it just became, with every single case that came into the White House post-
9/11, and there were lots, we got into the habit of just asking, Is he no-flied? Is he no-
flied? Is he no-flied? And the bureaucracy at first would respond, "We don't know," and 
they couldn't keep track of all these lists.27 
Although the TSA seemed to possess the list, it was the FBI and other agencies that 
supplied, and often seemed to control, the content. As one key official at the time put it, 
this was a continuation of operations begun the clay after 9/11: 
At the request of the FBI, the FM issued SD-108-01-06/EA 129-01-05, which included 
a list of individuals developed by the FBI as part of the Pentbom [sic] investigation 
[PENTTBOM was the codename for the FBI's investigation of the 9/11 attacks) .... The 
FBI "controlled," both administratively and operationally, the contents of the list and added 
or removed names in accordance with the Pentbom [sic] investigation. The FM received 
the list from the FBI and disseminated it to air carriers, without any format or content 
changes. FAA, in essence, acted as a conduit for the dissemination of their "watchlist."28 
24 Kahn, supra note 9, at 138 (Author's Interview, Mar. 14, 2011, Arlington, Virginia). 
25 Pub. L. No. 107-71, S lOl(a), 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified at 49U.S.C.Sl14(h)(3)(A)-(B)). 
26 According to Jackson, who was one of the Bush administration's negotiators for the ATSA bill that estab-
lished the TSA, "when TSA promulgated the Selectee and the No-Fly List, it was done through security 
_ directives." Kahn, supra note 9, at 296 n.105. 
21 Kahn, sufm1 note 9, at 139 (Author's interview, June 8, 2010, New York City). 
28 Internal TSA Memorandum on "TSA Watchlists" dated Oct. 16, 2002, from Claudio Manno, sufJra 
note 21. 
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This dynamic - the FBI supplying content compiled and distributed by the TSA -
rapidly grew the No-Fly List. Growing pains to a name-based watchlist were expected. 
Similar or even misspelled names caused frustration for passengers denied boarding. 
News stories abounded of the elderly, toddlers, and even the rich and famous all being 
subject to the vicissitudes of a No-Fly List that could not distinguish the partial record for 
"T. Kennedy," possible IRA terrorist, from Teel Kennedy, U.S. Senator. 29 
Another growing pain, however, was bureaucratic: a turf war between the new TSA 
and the old FBI. Emails between the TSA and FBIHQ, and between FBIHQ and FBI 
agents throughout the country, reveal growing tensions between these agencies but also 
the first signs of a twin challenge to the new watchlists: standardization and containment. 
Emails poured into the TSA from FBI agents throughout the country eager to use the new 
watchlisting tool to pursue and control suspects. "We've got a guy we want to no-fly," wrote 
one special agent. "Do you have a copy of the last one we gave you?'"0 The cutting-and-
pasting from one request to another was hard to control. Beyond a plaintive TSA request 
that "you state in the EC [electronic communication] that the FBI believes that the listed 
individual is a threat to Civil Aviation Security," there was little the TSA could do to verify 
that the watchlist was used for its intended purpose or based on a consistent quantity and 
quality of information. 31 The TSA, in tum, could be bureaucratic and unresponsive to 
FBI agents who demanded updated versions of the list, and who were often left to respond 
to a public increasingly confused by the new watchlisting regime. 
Solutions to these problems of standardization (quality control) and containment 
(mission control) were sought in the creation of two new institutions. President Bush 
announced this new direction and the first of these new organizations, the Terrorist 
Threat Integration Center (TTIC), in his January 2003 State of the Union address to 
Congress: 
Since September the 11th, our intelligence and law enforcement agencies have worked 
more closely than ever to track and disrupt the terrorists. The FBI is improving its abil-
ity to analyze intelligence and is transforming itself to meet new threats. Tonight I am 
instructing the leaders of the FBI, the CIA, the Homeland Security, and the Department 
of Defense to develop a Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge and analyze all 
threat information in a single location. Our Government must have the very best infor-
mation possible, and we will use it to make sure the right people are in the right places 
to protect all our citizens. 
The president noted both the new orientation of the FBI beyond law enforcement 
and the need for coordination in the intelligence community to meet national secu-
rity threats. The TTIC opened in May 2003 at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, 
with multiagency staff and funding. (The TTIC would eventually become the National 
Counterterrorism Center [NCTC], and relocate to a complex called Liberty Crossing 
in the Washington D.C., suburb of McLean, Virginia.) 32 Its mission is to gather all 
29 Sara Kehaulani Coo, Sen. Kennedy Flagged by No-Fly List, WASH. PosT, Aug. 20, 2004, at AO!; Lizette 
Alvarez, Meet Mikey, 8; U.S. Has Him 011 Watch List, N .Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2010. 
30 Redacted Email elated Feb. 4, 2003 (Bates Stamp B2-130), released in Gordon v. FBI, 390 F.Supp.2d 897 
(N.D. Cal. 2004). 
31 Redacted Email dated Oct. 11, 2002 (Bates Stamp B2-137), supra note 30. 
32 E.O. 13,354, S 5(£), 69 Fed. Reg. 53589 (Aug. 27, 2004). The status of the NCTC was codified a few 
months later in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, S 
1021, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified at 50 U.S.C. S 3056). 
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intelligence known to the U.S. government on international terrorism and counterter-
rorism in one central repository. 33 
In particular, the TTIC/NCTC was tasked to produce reports and analysis but, most impor-
tantly, to curate a single, massive database: the Terrorist Identities Datarnart Environment 
(TIDE).H The State Deparhnent's TIPOFF database - the one that grew from a shoebox to 
sixty thousand records- was transferred to the TflC, becoming the seed that started TIDE. 
To the extent permitted by law, all federal agencies were directed to send to the TTIC "on an 
ongoing basis all relevant Terrorist Information in their possession, custody, or control, with 
the exception of Purely Domestic Terrorism Information, which will instead be provided 
directly to the FBI."35 According to an August 2014 NCTC "factsheet" on TIDE (the most 
recent available): "As of December 2013, TIDE contained about 1.1 million persons, most 
containing multiple minor spelling variations of their names. US persons (including both 
citizens and legal permanent residents) account for about 25,000 of that total."36 TIDE was, 
in the words of one former NCTC director, "the mother of all databases ... if there's a piece 
of derogatory information on a known or suspected terrorist, it goes in that database."37 
Roughly contemporaneous with the TTIC's creation, another new organization, the 
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), was being developed. The TSC received much less 
fanfare than the TTIC, and certainly no mention in presidential addresses, but it was the 
core of the developing watchlist system. The consolidation of the federal government's 
information was important, but would take time - TIDE did not become operational 
until May 2005. TIDE also did not resolve continuing problems in the efficient use of 
information, the fundamental feature of the new watchlisting. One problem was inter-
agency coordination, as illustrated by conflicts between the FBI and TSA over the No-
Fly List. Another was quality control - a massive database full of inaccurate, partial, or 
old information could do more harm than good. The TSC was the institutional solution 
to these problems. 
The TSC was authorized by Homeland Security Presidential Directive Six (HSPD-6) 
on September 16, 2003, as "an organization to consolidate the Government's approach 
to terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist 
Information in screening processes." The Directive ordered all executive departments 
and agencies to provide the TTIC \vith "Terrorist Information."38 The TTIC, in turn, 
33 Intelligence on purely domestic terrorism remained the province of the FBI, a remnant of prohibitions 
on domestic activity by the CIA that date back to its creation. See 50 U.S.C. S 3036(d)(l) (authorizing 
intelligence collection "through human sources and by other appropriate means, except that the Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal 
security functions"). 
34 IRTPA·, sufJra note 32, S 102l(d)(6) (codified at 50 U.S.C. S 3056(d)(6)). 
35 Memorandum of Understanding on the Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against 
Terrorism, Sept. 16, 2003 (hereinafter "MOU"). 
36 https://www.nctc.gov/docs/tidefactsheet_aug 12014.pdf. An earlier factsheet provides evidence of the accel-
erating speed of watchlist expansion: "As of January 2009, TIDE contained more than 564,000 names, 
but only about 500,000 separate 'identities' because of the use of aliases and name variants. U.S. persons 
(including both citizens and legal permanent residents) make up less than five percent of the listings." 
37 Ronald Kessler, THE TERRORIST WATCH: INSIDE THE DESPERATE RACE TO STOP THE NEXT ATIACK 
" 166 (2007) (quoting Vice Admiral John Scott Redd). 
'
8 This capitalized term is not defined in HSPD-6, a short one-page document. Its accompanying eight-page 
Memorandum of Understanding, however, defines Terrorist Information as information "about individu-
als known or appropriately suspected to be or have been involved in activities constituting, in preparation 
for, in aid of, or related to terrorism." 
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was directed to provide to the TSC "access to all appropriate information or intelligence 
in the TTIC's custody, possession, or control that the organization requires to perform 
its functions." Federal agencies would then use only the filtered products of the TSC to 
conduct screening. The Congressional Research Service illustrated this relationship in 
the acronym-rich diagram in Figure 3.1.'9 
The TSC became operational on December 1, 2003. Unlike the NCTC, the TSC 
has never publicly acknowledged its physical location; its complex in Vienna, Virginia, 
is known to exist only because the high-pitched buzz of air-conditioning units cooling its 
array of computers drew a noise complaint before the town council.40 Administered and 
funded through the FBI, it was designed, like the TTIC, with a multiagency staff that 
served all members of what was becoming known as the "VVatchlisting Community."41 
This is attested by the signature lines for the Secretary of State, Attorney General, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, and Director of Central Intelligence that conclude 
the Memorandum of Understanding accompanying HSPD-6. TSC staff expanded to 
include personnel borrowed from the Defense Deparhnent, Treasury Department, and 
private contractors. 
If the Terrorist Screening Center was the institution designated to consolidate, stan-
dardize, and regulate the use of watchlists, the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) was 
the vehicle by which the TSC sought to achieve this mission. In the words of Timothy 
Healy, the project leader who set up the TSC and would later serve as its director, TSDB 
was "the bucket that had them all in there."42 By "them," Healy meant a database from 
which usable watchlists - such as the No-Fly List - could be derived. A PowerPoint pre-
sentation Healy gave to congressional staff (and provided to the author in unclassified 
form) illustrates this relationship (see Figure 3.2). 
Why, one might ask, would "consolidation" mean creating two massive databases, 
TIDE housed at the TTIC/NCTC and the TSDB housed at the TSC? Like an old-
fashioned card catalog system, the TSDB kept track of the library of terrorist information 
housed in the TIDE and in FBI intelligence about domestic terrorism (which by law 
could not be collected by the CIA). Just as one might ask a librarian for help finding a 
particular book in the closed stacks of a library, the TSC guided access to the federal 
government's terrorist information. And by curating the TSDB, the Terrorist Screening 
Center used the authority given by HSPD-6 to set standards for all agencies submitting 
biographical and substantive information - known as "derogatory" information in watch-
listing nomenclature - into this system. 
Interposing the TSC-controlled TSDB between frontline users such as airport screen-
ers or police officers and the NCTC-controllecl TIDE served another function. The 
39 Krouse, supra note 16, at 16. 
40 Tom Jackman, Vienna Tormented by FBI Building's Non-Stop Buzz, WASH. PosT (June 21, 2012). The 
TSC describes itself simply as "housed in a nondescript building in northern Virginia." See Press Release, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2007 /august/tsc08 3107. 
41 The TSC director reports through the executive assistant director of the FBI's national security branch 
to the director of the FBI. Unlike the NCTC, given a statutory foundation by the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the only legal basis for the TSC is HSPD-6. By Fiscal Year 2007, 
the TSC had secured an $83 million budget and 408 staffed positions. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JuSTICE 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER 
(Audit Report 07-41) 1 (September 2007). 
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Figure 1.2. 'fSC PowerPoi¡'rt Slícle Depicting Inter-Agency Watchlisting Process.
TSDB is ¿rn unclassifiecl but sensitive r.vatchlist. Its recorcls link to, but clo not necessarily
re\Ieal, information that is classifiecl either bec¿ruse of its substantive content or because
it conlcl reveal sources or methocls of intelligence collection. In other worcls, this "carcl
catalog" provicles enough infomration al¡out the book on the restrictecl sheh,es of this
closecl librarv to be usefi-rl, but no ilìore. Access beyoncl the carcl catalog is therefore yet
¿rnother function of the Terrorist Screening Center, rvhich serves as the liaison behveen
frontline operators ancl sources of intelligence.
By setting those stanclarcls, ancl constantly evaluating ancl aucliting subr-nissions, the
TSC aìso fulfilled a thircl, more creative purpose: organizing subsets of tl-re infornia-
tion storecl in the TSDB into useful rvatchlists for recipient agencies (i.e., "clou,ustream"
r.vatchlists operatecl by "customer" agencies). Its rnultiâgency staff inclucles "subject mat-
ter experts" rvho aclvise on tlie particular needs of TSC "cllstomers." TltLts, the TSA
sencls officials to rvork u'ithin the TSC as aicles in preparing the No-Fly List. hr tl'ris way,
tlie watchlists that the TSC constructs are custontizecl to the neecls of the dotvnstre¿rm
agerrcies th¿lt use them.
III Development: Building lVatchlists
The NCTC ancl lhe TSC changecl the way terrorist inforrn¿rtion is storecl ancl ttsecl in
the Uniiecl States. The "stove piping" ancl "silos" that ch¿rracterizecl the pLe-9/l I Colcl
War era rvere, if not altogether banishecl, greatly clinlinishecl. Now ¿rnyorle 
- 
lrom the cop
rvalking a neighborhoocl beat, to the [iBI special agent rvorking ¿] c¿Ìse, to the intelligence
analyst at a renrote foreigr-r outpost 
- 
coulcl query a central repository aircl, through the
'fSC's 24fi call center, be connectecl w'ith tlie originating source of inteìligence ¿rl¡out
the subject of interest.
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But this new system also created nevv challenges. The greatest of these, on which the 
success of the entire enterprise depended, was the standard used to decide whether avail-
able information warranted including a person in the TSDB (known as "nominating" 
in the watchlisting nomenclature). This decision determines the size of the TSDB itself 
and what data are available to compose downstream watchlists. Make the standard too 
high and the repository would very likely be "too small" in the sense of being incomplete. 
But make the standard too low and the collections would grow unmanageably large, hid-
ing terrorist needles in watchlisting haystacks. The challenge is made more difficult still 
by the political pressures riding on either choice. Create a list that generates too many 
false positives and the public would soon demand public scrutiny in courts or other 
forums that would create limits the watchlisters were eager to avoid. But create a list that 
fails to stop successive attacks and its makers would face the wrath of a public angry for 
the opposite reasons. 
The standard of review for successful nomination to the TSDB is the "reasonable 
suspicion" standard. Although there has been minor variation in its wording, this stan-
dard has applied since at least 2009 as a result of a working group convened the previ-
ous year in which the TSC legal counsel played an instrumental role.43 Its most recent 
public articulation occurred in testimony given in September 2014 by TSC Director 
Christopher Piehota.4-t But a more detailed and revealing definition is found in the 
March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance. A leaked copy of this unclassified but "for offi-
cial use only/sensitive security information" document was published in 2014 by The 
Intercept, a blog operated by the investigative journalist Glenn Greenwald.45 Its 166-page 
detailed description of the process, standards, and criteria for watchlisting has largely 
been accepted as authentic, though it is not officially acknowledged as such by the 
watchlisting community. In it, the term "reasonable suspicion" is defined as: 
the standard that must be met in order to include an individual in the TSDB, absent 
an exception provided for in the Watchlisting Guidance. To meet the REASONABLE 
SUSPICION standard, the NOMINATOR, based on the totality of the circumstances, must 
rely upon articulable intelligence or information which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants a determination that an individual is 
known or suspected to be or has been knowingly engaged in conduct constituting, in 
preparation for, in aid of, or related to TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. There 
must be an objective factual basis for the NOMINATOR to believe that the individual is a 
KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. Mere guesses or hunches are not enough to consti-
tute a REASONABLE SUSPICION that an individual is a KNOWN or SUSPECTED TERRORIST. 
Reporting of suspicious activity alone that does not meet the REASONABLE SUSPICION 
standard set forth herein is not a sufficient basis to watchlist an individual. The facts, 
however, given fair consideration, should sensibly lead to the conclusion that an individ-
ual is, or has, engaged in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.46 
43 Kahn, sufJra note 9, at 158, 303 nn.11-12 . 
44 Safeguarding Privacy and Civil Liberties While Keeping Our Skies Safe: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Trnnsp. Sec. of the Comm. on Homeland Sec., I 13th Cong., 14 (2014). 
45 Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Blacklisted: The Secret Govemmenl Rulebook for Labeling You a 
Terrorist, THE INTERCEPT, July 23, 2014, https://theintercept.com/2014/07 /23/blacklisted/. 
46 Terms in small caps appear in this fashion throughout the guidance manual, indicating that they are terms 
defined in appendix I of the manual (this one is at "U"). See March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance (herein-
after "Guidance"), page 5 n. l. 
84 Jeffrey Kahn 
The Memorandum of Understanding accompanying HSPD-6 defined "Terrorist 
Information"; this Watchlisting Guidance builds on that foundation to define "terrorist 
activities" and "terrorism."47 As would be expected, these terms are defined to include 
violent and destructive acts. But they also include "activities that facilitate or support" 
a range of actions that are not inherently dangerous, their meaning dependent on the 
actors involved. For example, an innocent commercial exchange, viewed more suspi-
ciously, could be provision of "a safe house, transportation, communications, funds," 
etc.48 The terms "known terrorist" and "suspected terrorist" are also defined: 
KNOWN TERRORIST: is an individual whom the U.S. Government knows is engaged, has 
been engaged, or who intends to engage in TERRORISM and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITY, 
including an individual (a) who has been charged, arrested, indicted, or convicted for a 
crime related to TERRORISM by U.S. Government or foreign government authorities; or 
(b) identified as a terrorist or member of a designated foreign terrorist organization pur-
suant to statute, Executive Order or international legal obligation pursuant to a United 
Nations Security Council Resolution.49 
SUSPECTED TERRORIST: is an individual who is REASONABLY SUSPECTED to be, or has been 
engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to TERRORISM 
and/or TERRORIST ACTIVITIES based on an articulable and REASONABLE SUSPICION. 50 
It is noteworthy that a "known terrorist" is not defined as someone formally designated 
as such; the definition notes these designations as only "including" the universe of possi-
bly known terrorists (indeed, the crime for which the person might be arrested, charged, 
or convicted need only be "related" to terrorism in unspecified ways). The definition 
of a "suspected terrorist" is hard to untangle from the standard of reasonable suspicion 
embedded in the term. As one federal judge put it: "In other words, an American citizen 
can find himself labeled a suspected terrorist because of a 'reasonable suspicion' based 
on a 'reasonable suspicion.' "51 
The March 2013 Watchlisting Guidance provides for numerous exceptions to this 
standard. For example, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism (or her designee), without any individualized derogatory information, 
"may direct the TSC and NCTC to place categories of individuals from TIDE or TSDB 
on the No-Fly List, Selectee List, or into the TSDB for up to 72 hours.'"2 An expedited 
nomination process allows watchlisting over the phone "[i]f exigent circumstances exist 
(imminent travel and/or threat)," with documentation to follow within three days. 53 As 
47 See MOU, supra note 38. See Guidance, SS 1.14-1.15. 
48 Guidance, S 1.15. 
49 Guidance, Appendix I at "L". This definition seems to have recently broadened. An affidavit sworn 
by then-deputy TSC director Piehota filed in federal court on June 3, 2011, refers to the July 2010 
Watchlisting Guidance to define a known terrorist "as an individual who has been convicted of, currently 
charged with, or under indictment for a crime related to terrorism in a U.S. or foreign court of competent 
jurisdiction." Declaration of Christopher M. Piehota at 6 n.4, Mohammad v. Holder, Case No. I: l l-CV-
50 (E.D. Va.) (No. 22-1). 
~~ Guidance, Appendix I at "W." 
> 1'v1ohamedv. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 520, 531-32 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
52 Guidance, S I. 59.2. "To the extent practicable," this order "will be in writing." Id. After seventy-two hours, 
and in thirty-day increments, concurrence must be sought from the Deputies or Principals Committee. 
Id. at S I. 59. 3. 
53 G . I ,. I -s u1c ance, ~ . ) . 
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Table 3.1. TSDB activity, October 1,2008-SefJtember 30, 2013 
Fiscal year Nominations Rejected 
2009 227,932 508 
2010 250,847 1628 
2011 274,470 2776 
2012 3 36,712 4356 
2013 468,749 4915 
would be expected, non-U.S. persons (especially those outside the United States) are 
subject to more exceptions than U.S. persons. But even a U.S. person "for whom there 
is insufficient derogatory information to support entry in TSDB" must be included in 
TIDE if he or she has "a nexus to terrorism."54 
Most nominations to the TSDB are successful. This was verified in discovery permitted 
in recent litigation. In response to an interrogatory, the Justice Department produced the 
chart in Table 3.1 for TSDB activity between October 1, 2008, and September 30, 2013. 55 
Although nominations more than doubled in five years, the percentage of nominations 
rejected rose from slightly more than 0.2 percent in 2009 to only slightly more than 
1 percent in 2013. 
Once a name is nominated to the TSDB, it is considered for inclusion in "down-
stream" watchlists designed for the particular needs of different federal agencies. Thus, 
the 2013 Vlatchlisting Guidance provides that an individual may be added to the No-Fly 
List if the person "represents a threat" of committing various definitions of terrorism 
found in the U.S. Code to aircraft, the "homeland," or U.S. facilities abroad. A person 
may also be added to the No-Fly List whose threat of "engaging in or conducting a vio-
lent act of terrorism" is judged real although the target is not locatable, so long as the 
person is "operationaliy capable" of such action. 56 
How judged? Oddly, the 2013 Watchlisting Guidance makes no reference to any eval-
uative standard in describing these No-Fly List criteria. Prior to the leak of this manual, 
high-level individuals familiar with the process struggled in interviews with the author to 
answer within the confines of an information environment in which the criteria them-
selves could not be identified. They finally agreed, however, that an analyst "must at 
least have a reasonable suspicion that the criteria were met, but the process of decision 
making is hard to reduce to the traditional legal standards familiar to lawyers."57 
54 Guidance, S 3.15.2. How a nexus is found when there is insufficient derogatory information to watchlist 
in the ordinary fashion is unexplained . 
5 5 Defendants' Objections and Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, l'vlohamed v. Holder, 1: l l-
cv-00050-AJT-TRJ (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 91-3). 
56 Guidance, S 4.5. After years of asserting that publication of these criteria would threaten national security, 
they are now publicly acknowledged by the government. See Tarhuni v. Lynch, 129 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 
1055 (D. Or. 2015). 
57 Kahn, supra note 9, at 168-69. The government has since confirmed this conclusion. See Declaration of 
G. Clayton Grigg, Deputy Director for Operations, Terrorist Screening Center, May 28, 2015, Tarhuni v. 
Lynch, No. 3:13-cv-l (D. Or. Sept. 1, 2015) (No. 105-A). ("Nominations that recommend an individual 
also be included on either the No Fly or Selectee List are evaluated by the TSC to determine if the deroga-
tory information provided by the nominating agency establishes a reasonable suspicion that the individual 
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Where did the reasonable suspicion standard originate? An interagency working group 
developed this standard beginning in 2008. 58 It was modeled on the standard for a police 
"stop-and-frisk" that the Supreme Court devised in 1968 in Terry v. Ohio. 59 The Court 
held that Police Detective McFadden, though lacking probable cause to arrest John 
Terry and Richard Chilton, could nevertheless briefly stop, question, and frisk them (the 
latter for the officer's safety) if McFadden could "point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion."6<J Although some in the working group raised concerns about the differences 
between the law enforcement and intelligence contexts, the group adopted a strikingly 
similar standard. This was not uncommon. The NSA adopted the same standard for its 
secret metaclata collection program.61 
But the Terry test was designed for the world of the old watchlists, one in which a 
sharp boundary line divided watching from acting on what was observed. When that 
limit was reached, the law required a public process in which executive action was 
assessed by a neutral judge. Indeed, immediately after setting forth the Terry reason-
able suspicion standard, Chief Justice Warren's very next sentence described the classic 
boundary against which - and only against which - such an exception to probable 
cause made sense: 
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that 
at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to 
the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of 
a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.62 
Adopted for the new watchlists, the "reasonable suspicion" standard is stripped of 
this context. The "who, what, and where" of the boundary - which give that boundary 
meaning - are no longer present. The decisions made by executive officials at the TSC 
and NCTC (unlike the evaluation of Detective McFadden's judgment by a court) were 
not intended to be subject to judicial oversight. Nor was there intended to be a second, 
public forum at which a final determination about the individual's rights would be made 
under heightened rules of evidence. McFadden stopped Terry because if his suspicions 
were right, McFadden would arrest Terry, a prosecutor would charge him with a crime, 
and a judge would oversee his trial. Watchlisting does not proceed past the stop. Loosed 
of these constraints, imposed as much by the liberty-protecting function of the separation 
of powers as by the Fourth Amendment, the reasonable suspicion standard that populates 
meets additional heightened derogatory criteria that goes above and beyond the criteria required for inclu-
sion i.n the broader TSDB"). 
58 A more detailed treah11ent of its development is found in Kahn, sufmz note 9, at 158, 169-171, & 303 
nn.11-12. 
59 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
60 Id. at 21. Detective Mc Fad den's actions might well have fallen short of the requirements of this test. Cross-
examined at one of the criminal trials, he testified: "Some people that don't look right to me, I will watch 
them. Now, in this case when I looked over they didn't look right to me at the time." John Q. Barrett, 
AfJ{Jendix B State of Ohio v. Richard D. Chilton and State of Ohio v. John W. Terry: The Suppression 
Hearing and Trial Transcri{Jts, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1387, 1456 ( 1998). Other factual details, as well as the 
racial undertones and societal context of the case, have come under scrutiny. Lewis R. Katz, Terry\'. Ohio 
at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 Miss. L. J. 423 (2004). 
61 Robert S. Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Information Age, 126 YALE L.J. F. 8, 9 (April 27, 2016). 
62 392 U.S. at 21. 
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the TSDB and the No-Fly List gives the false appearance of constraint, as shadows give 
the illusion of bars on a window. 
IV Growth and Use 
In the earliest clays of watchlisling, closest in time to 9/11, there were few incentives to be 
unclerinclusive. In response to a 2005 DOJ Inspector General's audit, the TSC attributed 
incomplete, inaccurate, or inconsistent information in the TSDB to "the immediate need 
during the earliest clays of the TSC to develop a comprehensive database of potentially 
high-risk suspects."('' The first TSC director, Donna Bucella, explained that "to err on the 
side of caution, individuals with any degree of a terrorism nexus were included" in the 
TSDB if at all possible.M According to Justice Department auditors, Bucella explained that 
one of the benefits of watch listing individuals who pose a lower threat was that their 
movement could be monitored through the screening process and this could provide 
useful intelligence information to investigators. In addition, she stated that watch list-
ing lower-threat individuals that have associations with higher-threat level terrorists may 
lead to uncovering the location of higher watch listed individuals.65 
Such policies tended to have long tails. Consider, for example, the interconnected 
nature of the TSDB and the No-Fly List generated from it. From the sixteen names on 
the FM "do-not-carry" security directives on September 11, 2001, there were upward of 
sixty-four thousand "identities" in September 2014 (Table 3.2).66 
A 2009 DOJ audit found substantially untimely delays in both nominating and remov-
ing individuals considered to be "investigative subjects" from the TSDB.67 Perhaps 
most disconcerting, the audit found more than sixty thousand nominations for "non-
investigative subjects" that had not followed the standard nomination process; internal 
controls over such nominations were found to be "weak or nonexistent."68 
63 FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER, supra note 41, at 2. 
64 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF THE 'TERRORIST 
SCREENING CENTER (Audit Report 05-27) 30 (2005). 
65 Id. 
66 1'1 · t. · f I . . S . ffi . l I I b f " d " 1ese stahs ics require care u mterpretahon. ometimes, o cia s revea tie mun er o recor s or 
"identities" in a database or watchlist. This is not synonymous with the number of unique individuals, 
which is often much lower because of duplicate records, aliases, and other multipliers in these systems. 
Thus, the figure of sixty-four thousand identities noted in the text is drawn from testimony provided by 
TSC Director Piehota. See Hearing before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of the Comm. 011 Homeland Sec., 
sufJTa note 44 ("The Terrorist Screening Center currently stands at about 800,000 identities. For those 
identities, for the No-Fly List, we are looking at about 8 percent of the overall population of the TSDB 
are watchlisted at the No-Fly level; about 3 percent of the overall population of the TSDB is watchlisted 
at the Selectee level.") The labels in this table are those used in the sources cited for each statistic. 
67 AuDrr DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S TERRORIST WATCH.LIST NOMINATION PRACTICES 23 & 36 (2009) (finding 
"78 percent of the FBI terrorist watchlist nominations we reviewed were completed in an untimely man-
ner" and that "the FBI was untimely in its removal of the subjects in 72 percent of the cases we reviewed 
and when the FBI removed these subjects, it took, on average, 60 days to process the removal requests"). 
68 Id. at 46 ("In total, more than 62,000 watchlist nominations have been made by non-standard FBI nom-
ination processes. We also found almost 24,000 FBI watchlist records that were not sourced to a current 
terrorism case classification. Many of the records we tested were based on cases that had been closed years 
ago and should have been removed at that time. These records caused individuals to be screened unnec-
essarily by frontline screening personnel."). 
Table 3.2. Watchlist Ex/>ansion Between September 2001 and February 2007 
Date 
Sept. 11, 2001 
Nov. 2001 
Dec. 2001 
Terrorist screening database (TSDB) 
Dec. 22, 2001 AA Flight 63 Richard Reid ("shoe bomber") 
Apr. 2004 "' 150,000 recorcJsc 
July 2004 "'225,000 records 
Feb. 2006 
July 2006 
Start of TSC Review 
Feb. 2007 




("' 170,000 "unique terrorist iclentitics")d 
"'400,000 recorclsc 
724,442 recorclsh 
"'400,000 "unique individuals"i 
1,183,447 "known or suspected international 







Sept. 2009 3,403 peop]ek 
Dec. 25, 2009 NW Flight 253 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab ("underwear bomber") 
Jan. 2011 I 0,000 people1 
Sept. 2011 16,000 indiviclua]sm 
Feb. 2012 "'520,000 people" 21,000 people0 
Sept. 2014 800,000 iclentitiesP 64,000 identities'! 
• Internal TSA Memorandum from Claudio Manno, Acting Associate Under Secretary for Transportation 
Security Intelligence, to Associate Under Secretary for Security Regulation and Policy, Oct. 16, 2002 
(ACLU FOIA Release, Al-010). 
h PowerPoint, TSIS, Dec. 2002 (ACLU FOIA Release, Al-03), sufJra note 30. 
" Follow-Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 41, at 7. 
<l Id. 
c Id. 
r Id. at 31-32. 
g Id.at31-32. 
1i Id. at 7. 
i U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, The Federal Bureau of Investigation's 
Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices (Audit Report 09-25) I, n.40 (May 2009). 
i Id. at I. 
k Author's interview, FBI HQ, Washington D.C., Dec. 4, 2009. 
1 Jamie Tara bay, The No-Fly List: FBI Says It's Smaller than You Think, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 
26, 2011). 
m Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Transportation Security of the Committee on Homeland 
Security, supra note 44 (statement by Congressman Cedric L. Richmond). 
" Bob Orr, Inside a Secret U.S. Terrorist Screening Center, CBS News, Oct. I, 2012. 
° Carol Cratty, 21,000 people now on U.S. No-Fly List, official says, CNN, Feb. 2, 2012 (quoting unnamed 
official). 
P Testimony ofTSC Director Piehota, supra note 44. 
'I Id. 
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The result, as litigation would eventually reveal, was a TSDB and set of downstream 
watchlists that were sticky: the legacy of once having been watchlisted, even if later 
removed from one part of the system, tended to linger. ln the words of one judge, "Once 
derogatory information is posted to the TSDB, it can propagate extensively through the 
government's interlocking complex of databases, like a bad credit report that will never 
"6'1 go away. ' 
·whatever its faults, the TSDB had grown into an extraordinarily powerful and useful 
tool. There was now a watchlist available to every police officer in the United States, 
expanding the list of bad apples and "usual suspects" far beyond any previous capacity. 
According to a former TSC director: 
So if you are speeding, you get pulled over, they'll query that name. And if they are 
encountering a known or suspected terrorist, it will pop up and say call the Terror[ist] 
Screening Center. So now the officer on the street knows he may be dealing with a 
known or suspected terrorist. 70 
And even if there is no arrest, or even any indication that the label placed on the 
individual is the correct one, the police encounter will augment the watchlist record 
with that person's observed activities, destination, and associates, all entered in the 
TSDB. 71 
The No-Fly List also came into its own as one of the key counterterrorism tools of 
the TSA. This was due to two substantial changes in this watchlist from the old security 
directives from which it emerged. First, the application of the "reasonable suspicion" 
standard to build the No-Fly List was a departure from the much narrower standard that 
security directives used "to pass on specific, credible threats and mandatory countermea-
sures" subject to civil penalties for noncompliance.72 The "do-not-carry" variety of these 
security directives were limited to denying boarding to those individuals determined to 
present "a direct and credible threat to aviation."73 But when creating the TSA in 2001, 
Congress expressed interest in the identification of individuals who may be "a threat to 
civil aviation or national security."74 The disjunctive "or" was now viewed as authority to 
use the No-Fly List to prevent air travel by someone who was not a threat to civil aviation, 
but who met the expansive definitions and low standard described above. 
Second, control of the watchlist by commercial airlines was significantly reduced. 
Frustrations in implementing an expanding No-Fly List, and the hazards perceived in a 
watchlist revealed to persons outside the government, led to the conclusion that watch-
list screening- like security checkpoints - should be "an inherently governmental func-
tion."75 This was implemented in 2008 by the "Secure Flight" program, through which 
~9 Ibrahim v. OHS, 62 F. Supp. 3cl 909, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
~O Bob Orr, Inside a Secret U.S. Terrorist Screening Center, CBS NEWS, Oct. 1, 2012. 
; I Id. 
72 Department of Transportation Selected Aviation Security Initiatives, Appendix H to REPORT OF THE 
PRES!DENT"S COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TERRORISM 178 ( 1990). 
73 Memorandum for the Record, 9/11 Commission interview with Claudio Manno, Oct. 1, 2003, at 8 . 
...,4 1 See sufm1 note 25. 
75 DHS OFFICE oF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, RoLE OF THE No FLY AND SELECTEE LISTS IN SECURING 
COM!\IERCIAL AVIATION 4 (2009). The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, S 4012(a)(l), 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified at 49 U.S.C. S 44903(j)(2)(C)), transferred the 
ministerial function of comparing passenger information to watchlists from the airlines to the TSA. 
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passenger information is sent to the TSA when an airline ticket is purchased for compar-
ison against the relevant watchlists.76 
Given the power of these watchlists to track and, potentially, affect a wide variety of 
restrictions on rights, what explains the generally muted public attitude toward them? 
One answer might reside in the small number of U.S. persons (defined as citizens and 
permanent residents) who are watch listed. Testifying before Congress in late 2013, TSC 
Director Piehota estimated that U.S. persons on the No-Fly List were about "0.8 percent 
of the overall TSDB population," or sixty-four hundred identilies.77 Since so few U.S. 
citizens find themselves on such watchlists - and so many individuals subject to them 
lack representation in democratic forums - many are happy to have the costs of security 
externalized in this fashion. 
V Litigation 
A key FM and TSA intelligence official could not recall anyone subject to a pre-9/11 
security directive who had contested a denial to board, or even attempted to board a 
plane, once such an order had been issued. Perhaps because of the long interagency 
process for sharing intelligence with commercial airlines, such "watchlisted" individuals 
had stopped flying by that point.78 
The size and expanded coverage of the No-Fly List, on the other hand, led to lit-
igation both about that watchlist and eventually about the larger TSDB from which 
it originates. Such lawsuits presented unusual difficulties. Since government officials 
declined to confirm watchlisting decisions, some plaintiffs had difficulty satisfying 
standing requirements or found their complaints mooted by agency action on the eve 
of judicial scrutiny.79 In their lawsuits, some plaintiffs alleged not only that they were 
wrongly placed on watchlists, but that they were subsequently approached by FBI 
agents who offered to restore their ability to travel in exchange for becoming govern-
ment informants.80 In other cases, plaintiffs alleged harassment or even torture by the 
FBI or foreign government agents acting jointly with the FBI, using the No-Fly List as 
a tool of coercion and control. 81 
If the multiagency design of the watchlisting process was not intended to make litiga-
tion more difficult- and there is no available evidence that it was - that was nevertheless 
a consequence. Authority to curate the TSDB and compose downstream lists lay with 
the TSC. Operational use of those lists (such as the No-Fly List) resided with "customer" 
agencies (such as the TSA). Naming a defendant was therefore the first difficulty. 
7~ Secure Flight Program, 73 FED. REG. 64,018 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 49 C.F.R. SS 1540 & 1560). 
7 / Testimony ofTSC Director Piehota, supra note 44. 
78 Author's interview with Claudio Manno, FAA HQ, Washington D.C., Mar. 14, 2011. 
79 Scherfen v. U.S. Dep't Homeland Sec'y, No. 3:CV-08-l 554, 2010 WL 456784 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2010); 
Tarhuni v. Lynch, 129 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (0. Or. 2015); Joint Stipulation Regarding the Effect of Plaintiff's 
Removal from the No-Fly List, Fikre v. FBI, 3: 13-cv-00899 (D. Ore. May 27, 2016) (No. 102). 
80 See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint, Latif v. Lynch, 3:10-750 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2013); Fifth Amended 
Complaint, Fikre v. FBI, 3: l 3-cv-00899 (D. Or. Nov. 29, 2015). These and other materials from similar 
cases may be accessed at the author's 'vVeb site, www.watchlistlaw.com. 
81 See, e.g., Fourth Amended Complaint, Mohamed v. Holder, l:l l-cv-50 (E.D. Ya. Mar. 7, 2014). 
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A lawsuit directed al the TSC alleging that placement on the No-Fly List had 
injured the plaintiff had to overcome the obstacle that the TSC had not itself pre-
vented the plaintiff from flying. That was the operational decision of the TSA. But a 
lawsuit directed at the TSA - which put the list into operation by issuing a security 
directive - faced a problem in obtaining a suitable remedy. A court could not order 
the TSA to remove a name from the relevant watchlists since that authority rested with 
the TSC. And courts initially insisted that would-be litigants exhaust their adminis-
trative remedies before the TSA (no such process exists at the TSC) prior to seeking 
judicial remedies against either agency. The administrative appeal process, nm by the 
Department of Homeland Security, is called OHS TRIP (Traveler Redress Inquiry 
Program). As its name implies, where watchlist related complaints are concerned, it is 
limited to complaints concerning the No-Fly List and Selectee List, but not the TSDB. 
Jn its early form, DBS TRIP generated a "final agency decision" that was often opaque 
and uninformative, an example of which is provided in an appendix to this chapter, 
Figure 3.4. 
Suing both together presented a separate difficulty. Among the powers and authorities 
transferred to the TSA upon its creation was a statutory provision elating to the creation of 
the FM in 1958 that provided for review of certain agency action only in the U.S. courts 
of appeals. 82 The government argued, successfully at first, that this provision deprived 
federal trial courts of jurisdiction to hear such complaints.83 This also had the effect of 
preventing pretrial discovery and the submission of evidence by the plaintiff outsideof 
any administrative record.8-+ vVhen such lawsuits occurred, such records would typically 
be filed under seal. In one early case, a description of the submitted record was docketed, 
revealing that the record included a number of electronic exchanges between the TSA 
and the TSC, which had created the list.85 . 
Eventually, these impediments started to fall, In August 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals was persuaded that the relevant issue in watchlisting cases eoncerned the 
composition of watchlists, not their implementation at airports. As then Chief Judge Alex 
Kozinski wrote for the 2-1 majority: 
Our interpretation of section 46110 is consistent not merely with the statutory language 
but with common sense as well. Just how would an appellate court review the agency's 
decision to put a particular name on the list? There was no hearing before an adminis-
trative law judge; there was no notice-and-comment procedure. For all we know, there 
is no administrative record of any sort for us to review. So if any court is going to review 
the government's decision to put Ibrahim's name on the No-Fly List, it makes sense that 
it be a court with the ability to take eviclence.86 
82 49 U.S.C. S 46110. 
83 Tooley\'. Bush, No. 06-306, 2006 WL 3783142 at *26 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2006); Green v. TSA, 351 
F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1126 (W.D. Wa. 2005). 
84 Although that statute provided that when such a petition for review was filed, the agency must then "file 
with the court a record of any proceeding in which the order was issued," on at least one occasion, the 
government argued that it was not required to submit an administrative record at all. Gilmore v. Gonzales, 
435 F.3d 1125, 1133 n.7 (9th Cir. 2006). 
85 Kadirov v. TSA, No. 10-1185 (D.C. Cir. filed July 12, 2010). 
86 Ibrahim v. DHS, 538 F.3d 1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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Since composition was a TSC function, and the TSC was not subject to the jurisdiction-
shifting provision of Section 46110, the district courts were open to hear carefully crafted 
complaints.87 In 2015, the D .C. Circuit and Sixth Circuit adopted similar positions.88 
This opened the door for litigation before trial courts that could order discovery and con-
sider evidence outside the record. Attempts to obtain information in the form of interrogato-
ries or document requests, however, were often met with claims of executive privilege based 
on "sensitive security information" in the record or with assertions of the law enforcement 
privilege or state secrets privilege. 89 
Only one case has reached the trial stage in federal court. In November 2004, 
Dr. Rahinah Ibrahim, an accomplished Malaysian architect and academic, was nom-
inated to the No-Fly List by FBI Special Agent Kevin Michael Kelley. Kelley had mis-
takenly nominated Ibrahim to the No-Fly List by checking the wrong box on a watchlist 
nomination form, a mistake he acknowledged (and, indeed, seems only to have realized 
himself) at his deposition: the form was designed to assume nomination to all watchlists 
save those affirmatively excluded by marking a box.90 As a result, Ibrahim was arrested 
and detained when she arrived in a wheelchair at the check-in counter at San Francisco 
International Airport with her daughter to depart for an academic conference. Further, 
her student visa was later revoked (as a result of nomination to CLASS) and she has not 
been permitted to return to the United States despite twenty years as a lawful resident. 
Although her name was removed from some watchlists, and the government determined 
in November 2006 that she did not meet the reasonable suspicion standard, her name 
was repeatedly removed from and then re-added to the TSDB and other watchlists over 
the next several years.91 
87 Id. at 1255. In so doing, the court also rejected the government's frequently made (and previously successful) 
argument that TSC composition functions were so "inextricably intertwined" with TSA security orders as to 
require TSA as an indispensable party, forcing litigation into the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, 
No. 10-CV-750, 2011WL1667471 (D. Or. 2011), rev'd and remanded, 686 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012). 
88 Ege v. OHS, 784 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Mokdad v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 2015). Following 
revision to the DHS TRIP that resulted from ongoing litigation in Latif v. Lynch, the government took the 
position that "those conclusions are, in any event, not applicable to the TSA orders generated by the revised 
redress process. TSA now explicitly makes the final determination and does in fuct have the information 
and the authority to effechiate the relief Plaintiff seeks." See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 5th Amended Complaint at 5, Fikre v. FBI, No. 3: l 3-cv-00899 (D. Or. Jan. 21, 
2016) (No. 90) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The government argued that in any such S 
46110 review by a court of appeals, "consistent with past practice, classified and privileged portions of the 
records may be submitted ex parte and in camera for judicial review in the court of appeals." Id. 
89 See, e.g., Ibrahim v. OHS, 62 F. Supp. 3cl 909, 913-914 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Defendants' Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel at 1, Tarhuni v. Holder, 3: 13-cv-l (D. Or. Sept. 16, 2014) (No. 72). 
90 Ibrahim, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 916. The author served as a testifying expert for the plaintiff in this case. 
91 Id. at 922-23. Two email exchanges obtained in the course of discovery in this case suggest how the mere 
fact of being placed on a watchlist, more than the substantive grounds for watchlisting, can drive deci-
sion making in other parts of the government. The first email was sent between two officials in the State 
Department's visa office the clay after Dr. Ibrahim's arrest in San Francisco: 
As I mentioned to you, I have a stack of pending revocations that are based on VGTO [the FBI's 
Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization] entries. These revocations contain virtually no derogatory 
information. After a long and frustrating game of phone tag with INR [the Department of State's 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research], TSC, and Steve Naugle of the FBI's VGTO office, finally we're 
going to revoke them. 
Per my conversation with Steve, there is no practical way to determine what the basis of the investi-
gation is for these applicants. The only way to do it would be to contact the case agent for each case 
individually to determine what the basis of the investigation is. Since we don't have the time to do 
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It was Ibrahim's case that opened the door to the trial courts by removing the jurisdic-
tional impediment of Section 46110. After eight years of litigation, her one-week bench 
trial - ironically, her U.S. citizen daughter was erroneously prevented by the TSDB from 
attending and offering testirnony92 - led Judge vVilliam Alsup to conclude: 
At long last, the government has conceclecl that plaintiff poses no threat to air safety or 
national security and should never have been placed on the no-fly list. She got there by 
human error within the FBI. This too is conceded. This was no minor human error but 
an error with palpable impact, leading to the humiliation, cuffing, and incarceration of an 
innocent and incapacitated air traveler. That it was human error may seem hard to accept-
the FBI agent filled out the nomination form in a way exactly opposite from the instructions 
on the form, a bureaucratic analogy to a surgeon amputating the wrong digit.93 
Despite these strong words, the court limited its remedy - scrubbing "every single gov-
ernment watchlist and database" - to instances that would be hard to uncover, as this 
long lawsuit itself demonstrated: "a conceded, proven, undeniable, and serious error by 
the government - not merely a risk of error."94 
Therefore, perhaps the case that has had the most significant influence on the No-
Fly List is Latif v. Lynch. In that case, thirteen U.S. citizen plaintiffs (including several 
veterans) alleged that the No-Fly List prevented their domestic and international travel. 
Some of the plaintiffs alleged that FBI agents promised to arrange air travel if they agreed 
to become government informants. 
The long history of this case reads like a staged retreat. In addition to the jurisdictional 
arguments noted above, the government initially argued that plaintim had suffered no 
injury to their right to travel, a right that the government argued did not include "the 
most convenient means of travel," by airplane: "counsel's research shows that passenger 
ships frequently cross the Atlantic."95 After the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's 
that (and, in my experience, case agents don't call you back promptly, if at all), we will accept that 
the opening of an investigation itself is a prima facie indicator of potential ineligibility under 3(B) 
(Immigration and Nationality Act, S 212(a)(3)(B)]. 
Id. at 921 (emphasis in original). The second email was sent a month later between an official at the State 
Department's visa office and the chief of the consular section of the U.S. Embassy in Malaysia: 
The short version is that (Dr. Ibrahim's] visa was revoked because there is law enforcement interest in 
her as a potential terrorist. This-is sufficient to prudentially revoke a visa .. but doesn't constitute a find-
ing of ineligibility. The idea is to revoke first and resolve the issues later in the context of a new visa 
application .... My guess based on past experience is that she's probably issuable. However, there's 
no way to be sure without putting her through the interagency process. I'll gin up the revocation. 
Id. at 922. As a result, a consular officer wrote the word "terrorist" on the form letter Ibrahim received 
in December 2009, five years after her initial, erroneous watchlisting. Id. at 924-25. After the trial, 
in December 2013, the court noted and so held that "government counsel has conceded at trial that 
Dr. Ibrahim is not a threat to our national security. She does not pose (and has not posed) a threat of com-
mitting an act of international or domestic terrorism with respect to an aircraft, a threat to airline passenger 
or civil aviation security, or a threat of domestic terrorism." Id. at 915-16. 
92 Id. at 927. 
93 Id. at 927-928. 
94 Id. at 929. 
95 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 24 & 30, Latif v. Holder, 3: I O-cv-750 (Nov. 17, 2010) (No. 
44 ). The suggestion was answered by one of the plaintiffs, who alleged that his att-empt to travel across 
the Atlantic by cargo freighter was denied by the ship's captain "based on the recommendation of U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection." 3rd Amended Complaint at 4j 86, Latif, 3: IO-cv-750 (No. 83). 
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dismissal on Section 46110 grounds and remanded the case, Judge Anna Brown of the 
District Court of Oregon began a long (and still ongoing at the time of this writing) 
deconstruction of the No-Fly List and its nmltiagency support structure. The court 
rejected the argument that international air travel was "a mere convenience in light of 
the realities of our modern world." "Such an argument," she rightly pointed out, "ignores 
the numerous reasons an individual may have for wanting or needing to travel overseas 
quickly such as for the birth of a child, the death of a loved one, a business opportunity, 
or a religious obligation," all of which were implicated in the plaintiffs' allegations. 96 
The court also found the OHS TRIP determination letters to be inadequate, providing 
neither adequate notice nor a meaningful chance to be heard.97 
One year later, the court elaborated on this conclusion, finding that the low-threshold 
reasonable suspicion test, refusal to reveal the fact of or reasons for watchlisting on the 
No-Fly List, and one-sided nature of an administrative record offered for judicial review 
all conspired to create a redress process that "contains a high risk of erroneous depriva-
tion" of constitutional rights.98 Finding that the plaintiffs' right to procedural clue process 
was violated, but unwilling to dictate a suitable process, the court ordered the govern-
ment to "fashion new procedures that provide Plaintiffs with the requisite clue process 
... without jeopardizing national security."9'> In the meantime, the court ordered the gov-
ernment to disclose to the plaintiffs their status on the No-Fly List; seven of the thirteen 
plaintiffs were then informed that they were not on that watchlist. 100 
. In spring 2016, Judge Brown upheld in principle the new redress processes that she 
had compelled the government to devise (while permitting the underlying watchlist to 
remain operational). In particular, the court held that the No-Fly List could continue to 
use the reasonable suspicion standard so long as the government provided "( 1) a state-
ment of reasons that is sufficient to permit such Plaintiff to respond meaningfully and 
(2) any material exculpatory or inculpatory information in Defendants' possession that is 
necessary for such a meaningful response." 101 No live hearing, neutral magistrate, or abil-
ity to cross-examine witnesses was necessary in such a process, and even the statement 
of reasons could be redacted under certain circumstances to protect national security. 
On April 21, 2017, the seven-year-old case seemed to come to a close, at least in the 
District Court. 102 Judge Brown summarized the new OHS TRIP procedures: 
First, OHS TRIP (as noted, in consultation with TSC) would send to the traveler a noti-
fication letter that only indicates whether the traveler was on the No-Fly List. If the trav-
eler is on the No-Fly List and requests additional information, the revised procedures 
96 Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1303 (D. Or. 2013). This finding established the tangible "plus" 
necessary for an additional right to be free from false, government-imposed injuries to reputation as sus-
l)ected terrorists. Id. at 1304. 9~ 1 Id. at 1307-08. 
98 Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1153 (D. Or. 2014). 
99 Id. at 1162. The government initially appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit but then moved for volun-
tarv dismissal of its a1Jpeal. 
100 ' Latif v. Holder, 2015 WL 1883890 at * 1 (0. Or. Apr. 24, 2015). 
IOI Latif v. Lynch, 2016 WL 1239925, at'' 2 (0. Or. Mar. 28, 2016). One of the original plaintiffs, an air 
force veteran who described a seven-country odyssey by air and land in order to return to his birthplace 
in New Mexico, died three weeks before this ruling. Notice of the Death of a Party, Latif v. Lynch, 3: IO-
cv-750 (D. Or. Apr. 12, 2016) (No. 324) (noticing death of Steven William \Nashburn on March 7, 2016). 
Thus, five plaintiffs remained who contested their status on the No-Flv List. 
1 OZ Latif v. Sessions, 2017 WL 14 34648 (0. Or. Apr. 21, 2017). , 
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call for OHS TRIP (in consultation with the TSC) to send the traveler a second notifica-
tion letter that identifies the applicable substantive criteria and contains the unclassified 
summary of the reasons for the traveler's placement on the List. ... [I]f an individual 
timely responds to the second letter and requests additional review, OHS TRIP forwards 
the response and any enclosed information to the TSC for consideration. Upon com-
pletion of TS C's review of materials submitted to OHS TRIP, the TSC provides a writ-
ten recommendation to the TSA Administrator as to whether the individual should be 
removed from or remain on the No-Fly List and the reasons for that recommendation. 
The information that the TSC provides to the TSA Administrator may be a summary 
of the information that the TSC relied on to make its determination regarding whether 
the individual should remain on the No-Fly List and does not necessarily include all 
underlying documentation. The TSC's recommendation to the TSA Administrator 
may contain classified and/or law-enforcement sensitive information. In addition, OHS 
TRIP also provides the traveler's complete OHS TRIP file to the TSA Administrator, 
including all information submitted by the traveler. 103 
95 
Under the new procedures, the TSA Administrator then issues a final order adopting 
or rejecting the TSC recommendation concerning retention on the No-Fly List. That 
order will "state the basis for the decision to the extent possible without compromising 
national security or law-enforcement interests."HH 
Judge Brown rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the new process fell short of con-
stitutional requirements. 105 This was all the process the plaintiffs were clue, at least with 
regard to the No-Fly List. 106 
There remained, however, plaintiffs' substantive clue process claim. 107 Since the TSA 
now made the final decision regarding an individual's retention on the No-Fly List, 
the government argued (as it had begun to argue from the moment it began to revise 
these procedures) that the court of appeals now had exclusive jurisdiction over this final 
agency action under the old § 46110. The plaintiffs argued for district court jurisdiction, 
since the TSC seemed to retain the initial decision to compose the No-Fly List in the 
first place and was the source of the information that the TSA used to decide any DBS 
TRIP appeal. 108 
Judge Brown, considering this an issue of first impression, limited the reach of her 
decision, concluding "in the unique procedural posture of this case that jurisdiction 
over Plaintiffs' remaining substantive claims explicitly lies in the Ninth Circuit Court 
I03 Id., at *2, n.2 & *3. 
I04 Id., at *3. 
I05 Id., at "4. 
1 OG It is worth emphasizing that the Court focused only on the No-Fly List, not the TSDB or other TSC-
compiled and controlled watchlists. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring "the removal of 
Plaintiffs from any watch list or database that prevents them from flying," which implicated only the 
No-Fly List. Third Amended Complaint, Latifv. Lynch, 3:10-cv-750 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2013) (No. 83) at 
_ Prayer for Relief, «j 2(a ). 
JO; Id. at «j 145 ("Because Plaintiffs do not present a security threat to commercial aviation, Defendants' 
actions as described above in including Plaintiffs on a watch list that prevents them from boarding com-
mercial flights to and from the United States, and over U.S. airspace, are arbitrary, lack even a rational 
relationship to any legitimate government interest, and have unreasonably deprived Plaintiffs of constitu-
tionally protected rights, including their liberty interests in travel, freedom from false stigmatization, and 
nonattainder."). 
!OS Latif, 2017 WL 1434648, at *6. See also supra note 105. 
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of Appeals pursuant to S 46110." 109 At the time of this writing, an appeal in this long-
running, landmark case seems certain. 
Conclusion: The Future ofWatchlists 
"Electronic databases form the nervous system of contemporary criminal justice opera-
tions," Justice Ginsburg observed in 2009. Quoting Justice Stevens's dissent in another 
database case almost fifteen years earlier, she expressed concern for their reliability: 
Inaccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic information raise 
grave concerns for individual liberty. The offense to the dignity of the citizen who is 
arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public street simply because some bureaucrat 
has failed to maintain an accurate computer data base is evocative of the use of general 
warrants that so outraged the authors of our Bill of Rights. 110 
The dissenting justices' concern for the effect on liberty of inaccurate databases con-
tinues to motivate courts, as Judge Alsup's Ibrahim opinion and Judge Brown's Latif 
opinions attest. But courts have not been as concerned about the effect on liberty of 
the increasing use of these databases themselves. The technological innovations that 
make large, computerized databases integral components of government operations 
work a qualitative change to traditional modes of state action (investigation, regulation, 
distribution of benefits/burdens, etc.). 111 "[P]olice and other criminal justice officials are 
'trackers' rather than investigators," and "[t]he virtually ubiquitous availability of per-
sonal information to law enforcement, coupled with the advent of the investigatory stop, 
has radically altered the landscape of policing." 112 
Further, many of the new watchlists do not exist in a world in which a criminal trial is 
the concluding step available to evaluate the merit of state action. As a result, the assump-
tions that long established a boundary that limited use of the old watchlists via scrutiny 
by a neutral judge in an open forum are increasingly subject to challenge. Although the 
No-Fly List is presently the most well-known of the ne\\/ watchlists, there is no reason its 
logic must be limited to air travel. And the TSDB is increasingly tapped for new uses, 
some of which were imagined long ago, as revealed by a PowerPoint slide created by the 
TSC to brief congressional staff (and provided to the author in unclassified form; see 
Figure 3. 3): 
l09 2017 WL 1434648, at *7. Noting that the question of TSC's role in disclosing information both to 
the plaintiffs and to the TSA implicated procedural as well as substantive issues of clue process, Judge 
Brown noted that "this consideration may effectively limit this Court's rationale to the facts of this case. 
In the ordinary course, judicial review of a DHS TRIP determination will involve both procedural and 
substantive aspects because the reviewing court must determine both whether the Defendants provided 
sufficient information to the traveler and whether the TSA Administrator's substantive decision is sup-
ported by the record. Because only Plaintiffs' substantive claims remain pending in this case, however, 
this Court cannot determine whether the hybrid nature of an ordinary judicial review of a DHS TRIP 
determination would lead to a different result." Id. at *7, n.4. 
11 O Herring v. United States, 5 5 5 U.S. 13 5, 15 5-56 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens's 
dissent in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 (1995)) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
111 Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLORIDA L. REv. 1735(2015). 
112 Kathryne M. Young & Joan Petersilia, Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and the exfJcmsion of the 



















Figure 3.3. TSC PorverPoint Slicle circ¿ l)ecember 2009 on Current ancl Futttre Uses of the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB).
Manv fuLure uses o[u,atchlists rvere envisionecl u,hen the slicle in Figure 3.3 u,as createcl
in 2009, from controlling access to sporting event's, to patrolling city streets, to vetting gov-
ernment.benefits and gun licenses. The politics of gr-ur control in the United States have
(so far) lirnited expansior.r of rvatchlists into that last category, altliough legislation to create
a "No-Gun List" has been proposed in the rvake of mass shootings.rìr But the argttment
in favor of expansion has consistently been the same: if a person is "too clangeror:s to fly,"
tìrat person is too clangerous for any number of activities that, as the Pou'erPoint slicle at
Figure 3.3 shows, are lirnitecl only by tle imagination.
Indeecl, the expansive logic of the ¡rew u'atchlists has lecl state governments to tap
fecleral watchlists in various w,ays. Neu, Jersey makes the purchase of u,eapons corttingent
on a check of the TSDB, a I ist never intencled to serue this purpose.r r+ In \Ä/est Virginia, a
plan by local lau, enforcement to consult terrorist rvatchlists before allou,ing participation
ll3 Aft"rtheurassshootinginJune20i6ataniglrtclubinOrlando,Floricla,hvoproposalstouservatchlists
to restrict fireann transfers u'ere defeated in the Senate. See S..Aunclt. 4720 to S.Andt. 4685 (tâbled by
voice vote on June 20, 2016), htþs://nu,rv.congress.gov/anrendlnent/l l4th-congress/seuate-amenchnent/
4720, allrl S.Amdt. 4749 to S.Arnclt. 4720 (felled upon tabling of S.Amclt. 4720 on June 20, 2016), https://
www.congress.gor'/anrendn-rent/l l4th-congrcss/senate-aure¡'rclnrent/4749. A thircl and lnore stlbstantial
proposal, b)'Senator Sus¿n Collins (R-lvIE), received broacl bipartisan stt¡rport; see S,Amdt. 4814,162
CoNc. Rrc. S4-119-54420 (daily ed. June Zi, 2016), but uitirnateìy, not enough. David M. Herszenhorn,
Senate Votes to Keeþ Cun Proposal Alite, hut in Lintl¡o, N.Y. TIuas (June 23, 2016). My vieu, of tl.ris
proposal aligns u,ith the concerns expressed in this chapte r. SeeJen{rey Kaltn, A 'No Bu¡,' List for Gr¡lls Is
... 
ußud lde¿, N.Y.'l I;rras (Jul1 l.2016), at 423.
114 Snn N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)i9) '("No han<lgun 1:urchase permii or firearnrs ¡rurciraser identification carcl
shall l¡e issuecl ... to any person nanrecl on the consolidated Tþrrorist Watchlist rnaintained l¡)'Terrorist
Screening Center aclnrinisterecl b), the Fecleral Bure¿u of Investigation"). This reqrtiretnent rvas signecl
98 Jeffrey Kahn 
in an annual "bridge jump" so outraged the libertarian crowd of rappellers and bungee 
jumpers who make up the bulk of attendees that they decamped to an alternative site in 
Idaho. 115 In Minnesota, Fox News investigators pursued the logic of the watchlist to its 
extreme conclusion, asking why someone on the No-Fly List should receive a trucking 
license from the Minnesota Department of Public Safety. That Minnesotan's lawyer 
protested the obvious danger of barring an ever-expanding range oflawful activity, noting 
that his client 
has never been charged with a crime and has sued the government to obtain a fair 
process to challenge his wrongful inclusion on the No-Fly List. Like many other unem-
ployed Americans, he's trying to obtain credentials for a job so he can build a life for his 
family, including a baby. 116 
But Fox News investigators picked up on the apparent discrepancy between the fed-
eral conclusion that this man was too dangerous to fly and the state vievv that he 
was not too dangerous to drive an eighteen-wheeler. Whose "reasonable suspicion" 
should prevail? 
When the Supreme Court created the "reasonable suspicion standard" in its 1968 
opinion Terry v. Ohio, it included some words of caution about its use: 
Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating approval of police conduct outside the 
legitimate investigative sphere. Under our decision, courts still retain their traditional 
responsibility to guard against police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or 
which trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification 
which the Constitution requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be con-
demned by the judiciary and its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal 
trials. 117 
That might have established a check on the old watchlists, but it does not affect the new 
watchlists, for which no trial, criminal or otherwise, is contemplated. Indeed, ordinary 
police are not always even involved. The new watchlists are now so firmly established -
but still lacking in legislative and judicial oversight- that younger generations may reach 
political maturity in a society in which the "new normal" is the idea that access to lawful, 
everyday activities may be subject to executive control that renders citizenship a charac-
teristic akin to that of first-, second-, and third-class passengers on an airplane or ocean 
into law by Governor Chris Christie on August 8, 2013; the bill, A3867 (Linda Stender, primary sponsor) 
was introduced one month after the shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in nearby Newton, 
Connecticut. See Matt Friedman, Christie Signs 10 Cun Bills, but Leaves Controversial Measures on 
His Desk, NJ .Co~1 (Aug. 8, 2013); see also http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2012/Bills/PLl 3/114_.PDF. In 
the wake of the South Carolina AtVIE Church shooting, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) issued a 
press release announcing his support for a similar federal requirement. See Senator Charles Schumer, 
Newsroom Press Release (June 29, 2015), available at: httv:l/www.schumer.senate.gov/newsroom/ 
press-rel eases/after-sou th-ca ro Ii na-traged y-sc h u mer -launch es-new-cffo rt-to-pass-signi fi can t-bac kgro u nd-
c heck-co mmo n-sense-gu n-safety-legisl a ti on-weak-laws-all ow-peopl e-w ho-sh ou Id n t-obta in-guns-to-get-
them-a nd-use-them-i n-111assac rc-after-massacre-sena tor-wil l-invoke-199 3-bracly-b ill-passage-as-mod el-to-
em ula te-take-acti 011-<1 mericans-are-call ing-fo r-. 
115 Erin Beck, "Other Bridge Day" in Peril Idahoans Don't Want BASE Jum/Jers There, SUNDAY CAZETTE-
MAIL (Charleston, WV) (June 7, 2015). 
116 Tom Lyden, tvlinnesota Terror S11s/Ject Gets a Class A Trucking License, FOX News 9, Aug. 27, 2015. 
Amir Meshal is one of the fJlaintiffs in the Latif case. 
117 392 U.S. at 15. 
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liner. Indeed, a June 2016 poll conducted for CNN found that 85 percent of registered 
voters favored using the TSDB or No-Fly List to restrict gun ownership. 118 
V/atchlists developed as a closed system, meaning one in which watchlisting decisions 
were insulated from outside review. The Latifli!igation in particular reveals the govern-
ment interest in preserving that original formulation, notwithstanding a citizen's right to 
protections like those that established the boundaries for the use of the old watchlists in 
an earlier time. All the while, society's extraordinary interest in national security hangs 
over these cases. 
This perhaps reveals the wisdom of the framers of the U.S. Constitution in their 
defense of the separation of powers, for the tendency toward overinclusion has been 
(understandably) hard to avoid. At their facility in Vienna, Virginia, ·rsc employees 
walk past charred artefacts of the World Trade Center that stand as sculptures at the 
entrance to the facility. 119 Despite sincere efforts to create a culture in the agencies that 
create and use watchlists that can be trusted to make decisions requiring no external 
check and balance - and this objective is one repeatedly offered as grounds to exclude 
watchlisting decisions from judicial review - the record of recent experience suggests 
that the founding fathers were right to value the separation of powers as a fundamental 
protection of liberty. 
As the former TSC director Timothy Healy explained, "The problem I've got is if 
I allow that person to get on a plane and something happens, what do I say to those victims 
that go on the plane?" 120 Or as Captain Renault remarked in Casablanca, "Realizing the 
importance of the case, my men are rounding up twice the usual number of suspects." 121 
118 1'1 · 11 · ·1 I · 1. . 1 t I . 1 d' . 11s percentage was roug 1 y snrn ar across age, genc er, race, mcome, po 1tica par y, anc reg1011a 1v1-
sions. See CNN/ORC International Poll (June 16-19, 2016), available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/ 
2016/images/06/20/cnn_orc_poll_june_20.pdf. See also Samantha Neal, Americans Aren't Always as 
Divided on Gun Control as it Seems, Buffington Post (June 28, 2016), at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
en try /am ericans-gun-con trol-poll-orland o _us_ 5 77 2b6fl e4b0 3 5 2fed 3e040 2. 
119 Bob. Orr, Inside a Secret U.S. Terrorist Screening Center, CBS News, Oct. 1, 2012 ("Throughout the 
Terrorist Screening Center ate placed artifacts from various terrorist aUacks including Oklahoma City 
federal building, the USS Cole bombing, and the World Trade Centers. All sober reminders of how 
important their work is"). 
lZO Helen Jung, Case of Tigard Man, Grounded by No-Fly List, Offers Glimpse into Secretive Airport Security 
Screening, THE OREGONIAN, Apr. 12, 20! 2, at Al. 
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